- #Cryptocat per ios 7 how to#
- #Cryptocat per ios 7 generator#
- #Cryptocat per ios 7 software#
- #Cryptocat per ios 7 code#
We would like to suggest to Lebanese citizens to use Cryptocat instead of Facebook chat to communicate.
#Cryptocat per ios 7 how to#
This notion is unacceptable, and the Cryptocat Project is moving forward on proposing solutions for Lebanese people on how to protect themselves against this sort of seizure, should it happen. We’d like to talk about today’s news in Lebanon concerning the Lebanese Internal Security Forces demanding access to Facebook passwords from the Minister of Telecommunications. It's particularly frustrating because people risk death or torture or long term imprisonment in some parts of the world, and they need strong crypto. People shouldn't have been waiting for something like DecryptoCat before they stopped using CryptoCat. Except the badguys are not going to enter your competition the badguys either already know how to break the crypto or they use all the publicly available entries as help. They even took the ultimate snakeoil step of running a competition to crack their software. They ignored the advice from many people.
#Cryptocat per ios 7 code#
It's fine to release your code snippets as "proof of concept" or "demonstrations" so long as you give warnings that these are not to be used in real life.Ĭryptocat did not give those warnings. This is especially dangerous for crypto because these people might not understand the bugs they've created. They read a book or two, they read some source code, and then they implement their own version.
#Cryptocat per ios 7 generator#
See, for example, the random number generator bug in Debian. Smart people and many eyes make mistakes with crypto.
#Cryptocat per ios 7 software#
With cryptographic software a small, subtle, hard to find bug could render the product pointless could make the cryptography trivially easy to crack. See any bug tracker for bugs which have been left for years. Most of those bugs can be left without too much impact on the users. The thing about the cryptocat thing is that there are questions about transparency that are valid (and I've seen your conversation on twitter and agree with some of your points), but I'm trying to avoid falling into that situation.
That's not to say you're wrong, I think you have some valid points but in every other domain it appears there's a good enough level and when I at least encounter UK government crypto we're told it's the same. I see where you're coming from with it but to take your point I can pull keys out of a memory dump, who cares which process it comes from? In this case does it mean we should all wait for a perfect OS that scrubs memory on everything properly and encrypts swap? It's a matter of having something resilient enough for the use case not to matter. Don't make it harder to get found.Īs someone who's done a lot of non-crypto side channel stuff (particularly around signal modulation for exfil) I'm of the view that side channel stuff happens and it's not exclusive to crypto. Think of it like being a little kid lost in a shopping mall. How could anyone have any kind of grip on the safety of a system that fundamentally changes its crypto constructions so often?Ī lesson here: if you have to implement cryptography - and you and your users would be much better off if you didn't, and rather relied on a standard implementation like PGP - do one thing and stick with it. I'm not sure I've ever seen a system as popular as this so quickly take a tour of so much of cryptography. The difference between symmetric-keyed password-based encryption, RSA, Diffie-Hellman and ECC (presuming ECDH?) isn't minor it isn't a feature-level distinction. The hardest part of this to read for me isn't the vulnerability, but rather:Ģ011 Passwords: BPKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 with 1000 iterationsĢ011 Passwords: BPKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 with 600 iterations
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